Key Takeaways
- • The United States used low-cost one-way attack drones derived from Iran's Shahed-136 design for the first time in combat, according to Carnegie Endowment experts Steve Feldstein and Dara Massicot.
- • Analysts cite the cost gap of roughly $35,000 per LUCAS drone versus about $2.5 million per latest-version Tomahawk cruise missile, framing cost efficiency and mass as decisive factors.
- • Iran is launching hundreds of Shahed drones, as many if not more than its ballistic missiles, to attrit air defenses and damage critical facilities across Israel, the U.S., and Gulf partners.
- • Interceptor stockpiles, particularly Patriot missiles needed against ballistic threats, face strain if used extensively against Shahed drones, a concern raised as the conflict prolongs.
- • Experts argue Gulf states and U.S. forces lack the layered low-cost point defenses Ukraine has developed against Russian Shahed-type drones since 2022.
Summary
Carnegie Endowment scholars Steve Feldstein and Dara Massicot, in a question-and-answer piece published March 2, 2026, assess the role of one-way attack drones in the ongoing Iran war. Feldstein argues that the U.S. adoption of a design derived from Iran's Shahed-136 demonstrates that military innovation flows in multiple directions. He notes that Russia has invested $2 billion in a dedicated factory to produce Iran-derived drones, which it calls Geran-2 units, and that the cost logic is central: the LUCAS drone (Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System) costs about $35,000 apiece, compared with roughly $2.5 million for the latest Tomahawk cruise missiles. Although Tomahawks likely have a higher success rate, their use is constrained by cost.
Massicot describes Iran's current campaign as combining ballistic missiles with hundreds of Shahed drones aimed at attriting air defense systems in Israel, the United States, and partner states in the Middle East and at damaging critical facilities. Most drones are being intercepted at a high rate, but doing so requires near-constant counter-air patrols and ground-based air defenses that are also needed against Iranian missiles. Strikes have hit U.S. military bases, critical infrastructure, and civilian buildings. Massicot warns that Patriot interceptors, which are required for ballistic missiles, could be depleted if used extensively against Shaheds, and that without sufficient point defenses some drones are getting through.
The experts draw on Ukraine's experience, where Ukrainian forces have used fighter aircraft, helicopters, jamming and spoofing, anti-aircraft guns, and interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed attacks. Massicot says Gulf nations and U.S. forces do not appear to have replicated these low-cost defenses and recommends that additional point defenses be fielded at key facilities. Feldstein observes that conventional weapons appear dominant in the war's early days, but that resource constraints could grow if the conflict continues, and that some reports suggest U.S. air defense missile supplies could face shortages. He also cites The Economist's defense editor Shashank Joshi on "horizontal escalation," noting Iran has retaliated against Gulf states and deployed a drone against a UK base in Cyprus.
Feldstein cites data showing 58,272 air and drone events in 2025 that led to 32,769 fatalities, and expects drone use to continue rising on battlefields. Both analysts say they will watch interception rates for ballistic missiles and one-way attack drones, interceptor stockpiles, and how Iran, its proxies, and the U.S. and its allies adapt.
Massicot describes Iran's current campaign as combining ballistic missiles with hundreds of Shahed drones aimed at attriting air defense systems in Israel, the United States, and partner states in the Middle East and at damaging critical facilities. Most drones are being intercepted at a high rate, but doing so requires near-constant counter-air patrols and ground-based air defenses that are also needed against Iranian missiles. Strikes have hit U.S. military bases, critical infrastructure, and civilian buildings. Massicot warns that Patriot interceptors, which are required for ballistic missiles, could be depleted if used extensively against Shaheds, and that without sufficient point defenses some drones are getting through.
The experts draw on Ukraine's experience, where Ukrainian forces have used fighter aircraft, helicopters, jamming and spoofing, anti-aircraft guns, and interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed attacks. Massicot says Gulf nations and U.S. forces do not appear to have replicated these low-cost defenses and recommends that additional point defenses be fielded at key facilities. Feldstein observes that conventional weapons appear dominant in the war's early days, but that resource constraints could grow if the conflict continues, and that some reports suggest U.S. air defense missile supplies could face shortages. He also cites The Economist's defense editor Shashank Joshi on "horizontal escalation," noting Iran has retaliated against Gulf states and deployed a drone against a UK base in Cyprus.
Feldstein cites data showing 58,272 air and drone events in 2025 that led to 32,769 fatalities, and expects drone use to continue rising on battlefields. Both analysts say they will watch interception rates for ballistic missiles and one-way attack drones, interceptor stockpiles, and how Iran, its proxies, and the U.S. and its allies adapt.
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