Key Takeaways
- • The five most active Gulf sovereign wealth funds, the Saudi PIF, Qatar Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Mubadala and ADQ, accounted for about 61 per cent of the roughly US$180.3 billion invested by roughly 100 sovereign wealth funds worldwide in 2024, according to SWP Research Paper 2026/RP 03.
- • The five funds control combined assets of around US$3.5 trillion, nearly a quarter of the just under US$15 trillion in global sovereign wealth fund assets.
- • SWP researcher Stephan Roll argues the funds translate oil revenues into hard, soft and sharp power, often through arms, media, sports and technology investments, while keeping political ties largely out of public view.
- • The study warns that Gulf fund investments in Europe risk giving third parties access to critical infrastructure and sensitive military or security technology, and calls for screening and a coordinated German and EU foreign policy toward the three Gulf monarchies.
Summary
A new SWP Research Paper, published 4 February 2026 and authored by Dr Stephan Roll, Senior Fellow in SWP's Africa and Middle East Research Division, examines how Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar use their sovereign wealth funds to extend their foreign policy influence. The study focuses on the five funds that the paper refers to as the "Oil Five": the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), Mubadala and ADQ in the UAE.
According to the paper, the five ranked among the world's 10 most active sovereign wealth funds in 2024 for the third consecutive year. Their combined investment volume of about US$180.3 billion represented around 61 per cent of the total invested by roughly 100 sovereign wealth funds globally. The paper notes that the five's combined investment exceeded the German federal government's total public investment in 2025 of €86.8 billion.
The paper argues that the funds were initially conservative vehicles, mainly holding US government bonds, but since the 2000s have evolved into strategic investors that take direct stakes and influence corporate direction. ADIA acquired a 4.9 per cent stake in Citigroup during the 2007–08 financial crisis, though it has since pursued a more passive strategy. Mubadala, established in 2002 and renamed in 2017 after merging with the International Petroleum Investment Company, has taken entrepreneurial positions, including the takeover of Spanish oil company Cepsa and the establishment of GlobalFoundries.
Roll's central finding is that the funds rarely act as direct instruments of foreign policy. Instead, they expand the states' room for manoeuvre by investing in the arms industry, media, sports and new technologies, and by cooperating with politically influential actors. Investments abroad are often routed through private equity or venture capital vehicles, which the Gulf governments portray as apolitical and purely profit-oriented.
For Germany and the EU, the paper identifies a twofold challenge. Gulf fund investments offer liquidity, long investment horizons and access to Gulf markets, but they also carry risks, including the takeover of critical infrastructure, the targeted transfer of sensitive technology, and the potential use of new technologies to strengthen surveillance and repression. The paper says such risks require careful investment screening, which is difficult when capital flows through complex vehicles. It also notes that Gulf actions are at times at odds with European interests, citing climate negotiations, dealings with Russia and the conflict in Sudan.
The paper recommends a coordinated foreign policy toward the three monarchies that integrates foreign policy and economic interests, and suggests leveraging the funds' competing investment interests to advance German and European goals.
According to the paper, the five ranked among the world's 10 most active sovereign wealth funds in 2024 for the third consecutive year. Their combined investment volume of about US$180.3 billion represented around 61 per cent of the total invested by roughly 100 sovereign wealth funds globally. The paper notes that the five's combined investment exceeded the German federal government's total public investment in 2025 of €86.8 billion.
The paper argues that the funds were initially conservative vehicles, mainly holding US government bonds, but since the 2000s have evolved into strategic investors that take direct stakes and influence corporate direction. ADIA acquired a 4.9 per cent stake in Citigroup during the 2007–08 financial crisis, though it has since pursued a more passive strategy. Mubadala, established in 2002 and renamed in 2017 after merging with the International Petroleum Investment Company, has taken entrepreneurial positions, including the takeover of Spanish oil company Cepsa and the establishment of GlobalFoundries.
Roll's central finding is that the funds rarely act as direct instruments of foreign policy. Instead, they expand the states' room for manoeuvre by investing in the arms industry, media, sports and new technologies, and by cooperating with politically influential actors. Investments abroad are often routed through private equity or venture capital vehicles, which the Gulf governments portray as apolitical and purely profit-oriented.
For Germany and the EU, the paper identifies a twofold challenge. Gulf fund investments offer liquidity, long investment horizons and access to Gulf markets, but they also carry risks, including the takeover of critical infrastructure, the targeted transfer of sensitive technology, and the potential use of new technologies to strengthen surveillance and repression. The paper says such risks require careful investment screening, which is difficult when capital flows through complex vehicles. It also notes that Gulf actions are at times at odds with European interests, citing climate negotiations, dealings with Russia and the conflict in Sudan.
The paper recommends a coordinated foreign policy toward the three monarchies that integrates foreign policy and economic interests, and suggests leveraging the funds' competing investment interests to advance German and European goals.
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